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MARTIN MARIETTA AND THE EROSION OF THE ATTORNEY-




The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re Martin Mar-
ietta Corp. I has significantly rewritten the law of attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product protection. The decision greatly expands
the doctrine of implied waivers and applies it to a new context- the
settlement conference. By expanding the potential for waiver of the
protection afforded by the two doctrines, the court has opened
most, if not all, of a lawyer's litigation file to hostile parties under
many circumstances. Despite the opinion's broad new interpreta-
tions of the privilege and protection, it has gone relatively unno-
ticed by the legal community.2 This article discusses flaws in the
court's reasoning and explores the decision's ramifications.
In addition, a federal judge in the Southern District of New
York recently held that a standard audit letter disclosure of potential
litigation waives the attorney-client privilege and work-product pro-
tection as to underlying data from an outside counsel's investiga-
tion.' Other changes have eroded the security of information trial
lawyers have long believed to be confidential. The federal govern-
ment's aggressive pursuit of client fee information and the possibil-
ity of the restraint and forfeiture of legal fees from some criminal
defendants have raised serious concern within the defense bar.4
* United States Attorney, District of Maryland. B.A., Yale University, 1966; J.D.,
Duke University Law School, 1969. For his substantial contribution to this work, I wish
to thank Richard Kay, B.A., State University of New York at Plattsburg, 1985; J.D.,
University of Maryland School of Law, 1989.
The views expressed herein are strictly those of the author, and do not necessarily
reflect the position of the Department of Justice.
1. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1655 (1989).
2. A recent commentary criticizes the Martin Marietta opinion on policy grounds.
Note, Settlenent Situations and the Maintenance of Confidentiality: A Look at the Martin Marietta
Decision, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 187. The author concludes that a more restrictive
approach to subject-matter waiver is dictated by public policy concerns designed to en-
courage settlement negotiations. Id. at 206-10.
3. See infra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
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This Article analyzes these trends and predicts assaults on the attor-
ney-client relationship will continue and expand.
II. IN RE MARTIN MARIETTA
In Martin Marietta, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
cleared the way for courts to compel the production of attorney in-
terview notes and memoranda in fairly common circumstances. The
decision significantly expands the potential scope for waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine5 and nar-
rows the concept of opinion work-product.6
In November 1984, federal grand jury subpoenas were served
on Martin Marietta. The company retained outside counsel and
commenced an internal investigation.7 Investigators interviewed
employees, generating written materials including handwritten at-
torney notes of the interviews, attorneys' memoranda about the in-
terviews, and transcripts of tape-recorded interviews of witnesses.
Certain internal audits were conducted and audit workpapers were
generated.' Subsequently the Department ofJustice advised Martin
Marietta that the company and William Pollard, the head of one of
its subsidiaries, were targets of a federal criminal investigation into
improper billing for government contracts.9
Martin Marietta, through outside counsel, met with the prose-
cutors on several occasions in an effort to avoid prosecution.' Dur-
ing those meetings, the company's attorneys in essence asserted that
Pollard had defrauded and victimized the company." The United
States Attorney invited the company to submit its position in writ-
ing' 2 and agreed that any submission would not waive claims of at-
torney-client privilege or work-product protection.'"
5. See infra notes 29-87 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 88-120 and accompanying text.
7. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit at 3, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1655 (1989)
(No. 88-1157).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 4.
10. See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 621 (4th Cir. 1988) (implying that
the meetings were held to avoid prosecution by noting that "portions of some docu-
ments it sought to withhold had been earlier quoted in disclosures made by it to the
Government, either or both the United States Attorney and the Defense Logistics
Agency, part of the Department of Defense").
11. See id. at 622.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 3.
13. See Letter from George Beall to author (Sept. 17, 1986) (cover letter submitted
with position paper stating understanding that "government will not use information
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In September 1986, the company submitted a position paper
that by its own terms was based on the results of the internal investi-
gation. " The position paper quoted employee interviews, although
in most instances without attribution. t5 Perhaps most important
were certain assertions in the position paper. For example, at one
point it stated that "[o]f those consulted within the Company, all
will testify that any qualms they had about the arrangement had
nothing to do with worries about fraud."' 6 The negotiations were
mostly unsuccessful. In February 1987, the company pleaded guilty
to a three-count criminal information.' 7
Two months later, Pollard was indicted.' 8 Awaiting trial, he
subpoenaed Martin Marietta under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 17(c) 9 for various documents connected with the internal in-
vestigation, including the attorneys' notes, memoranda, transcripts
of the employee interviews, and the internal audit workpapers.2 °
The company moved to quash the subpoenas on the basis of attor-
ney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.2 1 Martin Mari-
etta was willing to, and subsequently did, provide to Pollard much
of the information it had provided to the government.2 2 The com-
contained in this submission against our client or any of the involved individuals"), re-
printed in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 35a-36a [hereinafter Letter from
George Beall].
14. United States v. Pollard, Crim. No. Y-87-0142 (D. Md. 1990) (undated Memo-
randum Opinion considering motion to compel discovery), reprinted in Petition for'Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 30a.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (using
same quotation).
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 4.
18. Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 620.
19. Id. Rule 17(c) provides as follows:
(c) FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND OF OBJECTS. A subpoena
may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books,
papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion
made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be un-
reasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents
or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time
prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence
and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects
or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
20. Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 621.
21. Id. at 620.
22. United States v. Pollard, Crim. No. Y-87-0142 (D. Md. 1990) (undated Memo-
randum Opinion considering motion to compel discovery), reprinted in Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 33a. Pollard's trial resulted in a jury verdict of acquittal on
all counts on May 3, 1990. The Sun (Baltimore), May 4, 1990, at 2B, col. 5.
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pany resisted additional discovery, however, on a limited waiver the-
ory: waiver had only been made as to the information actually
disclosed, and not by implication as to all underlying materials on
the same subject. 23 Martin Marietta refused to comply with the dis-
trict court's order enforcing the subpoena and was held in
contempt.2
4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the attorney-client priv-
ilege and work-product protection had been effectively waived as a
result of the position paper disclosures to the United States Attor-
ney.25 The court did make an exception for "pure expressions of
legal theory or mental impressions"' 26 such as margin notes reflect-
ing an attorney's assessment of witness credibility.27 The court
drew a distinction between opinion and nonopinion work-product,
and remanded the case with instructions that pure opinion work-
product retained protection despite the waiver and its production
could not be compelled.28
The result is extraordinary for two reasons. First, the Fourth
Circuit interprets an attorney proffer as an appropriate context for a
waiver of privilege. Second, it dramatically redraws the parameters
of work-product while either misapprehending or ignoring relevant
Supreme Court precedent.
A. The Purposes for the Protections
The attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine
have evolved separately and each has a distinct purpose. 29 The at-
torney-client privilege is intended to promote full and frank commu-
nication between those in need of legal advice and attorneys by
protecting the confidentiality of both discussions and correspon-
dence.3" The work-product doctrine, on the other hand, protects
23. Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 623.
24. Id. at 621.
25. Id. at 623-26.
26. Id. at 626.
27. Id. at 626 n.2.
28. Id. at 626.
29. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 917-20(1983); see also J. GERGACZ, ATrORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1.02, 7.01[1]
(1987) (historical background of the two doctrines); Cody, The Attorney-Client Privilege and
the Work Product Immunity Doctrine for the Corporate Client, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 251 (1986).
30. E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRoD-
UCT DOCTRINE 2 (2d ed. 1989); Note, Corporate Disclosure and Limited Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 813-14 (1982). See generally J. GERGACZ, supra
note 29, 1.03; Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants,
63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 213-32 (1989) (discussing theoretical rationale of the privi-
920 [VOL. 49:917
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papers prepared by or on behalf of an attorney so that work per-
formed in anticipation of litigation may be done "with a certain de-
gree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties
and their counsel."'" The distinction was aptly drawn by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: "[T]he work-prod-
uct privilege does not exist to protect a confidential relationship,
but rather to promote the adversary system by safeguarding the
fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from the discovery attempts
of an opponent. 3
2
These distinctive purposes were first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,33 where an attorney preparing
for potential litigation interviewed several witnesses and subse-
quently sought to avoid complying with an opponent's discovery re-
quest, claiming the interview materials were protected by the
attorney-client privilege.34 The Supreme Court initially determined
that the privilege did not apply because the communications at issue
were made by witnesses, not by the client.35 The Court then estab-
lished the doctrine that work-product materials are entitled to quali-
fied protection.36 The reason for the protection was not to promote
full and frank communication between attorney and client or even
between attorney and witness; rather, it was to promote the adver-
sary system ofjustice by forcing attorneys to prepare their own cases
instead of allowing them to obtain the fruits of their opponents'
preparation.
These underlying purposes are critical in an evaluation of the
lege as part of the introduction to a major empirical study of practitioners' views of the
privilege).
31. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). See generally E. EPsrEIN & M.
MARTIN, supra note 30, at 100-03; Smith, The Work Product Doctrine: Its Origin, Evolution
and Status in Modern Practice, 33 S.D.L. REV. 224 (1988).
32. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(emphasis omitted).
33. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
34. Id. at 499.
35. Id. at 508.
36. Id. at 509-12.
37. Id. at 511. The Court stated that:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what
is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the prep-
aration of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoral-
izing. And the interests of the clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly
served.
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conduct that will constitute a waiver of privilege or protection. 8
Because the attorney-client privilege protects confidentiality, any
disclosure to a third person destroys the protection.3 9 In contrast,
work-product might be disclosed to a nonopponent third person
without undermining the integrity of the adversarial process.4 °
Consequently, at least where work-product is concerned the context
of the disclosure can be critical to a determination of a waiver.4 '
B. The Context of the Disclosure
Martin Marietta's disclosures in its position paper involved both
attorney-client communications and attorney work-product.4 2 The
company urged the Fourth Circuit to adopt the concept of limited
waiver to shield the material.43
There are two distinct types of limited waiver: partial and selec-
tive.4 4 Partial waiver is the strategic disclosure of a subset of a
larger class of privileged or protected material.45 Selective waiver is
a purposeful disclosure to a third person by a party who continues
to assert privilege or protection as to all others. 46 Both types were
implicated in Martin Marietta because the position paper disclosed
the results of the investigation without disclosing the underlying
data, and because the position paper was disclosed to the govern-
ment under an agreement that no one else would see it.
The Fourth Circuit conducted its entire analysis under the ru-
bric of partial waiver. The court ignored the fact that the disclosure
38. SeeJ. GERGACZ, supra note 29, 7.02[3][c], at 7-38. Because Hickman recognizes
that work-product is not privileged material but is still entitled to protection, the term
"privilege" is used throughout this article for clarity to refer only to the attorney-client
privilege. Work-product material, often erroneously labeled as "privileged" by com-
mentators or courts, will be identified in this article as material subject to "work-product
protection" or the "work-product doctrine." See Cohn, supra note 29, at 922-24 (defining
work-product).
39. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93, at 226-27 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Because no
privilege attaches to communications knowingly made in the presence of a third person,
the disclosure of privileged material is analogous. Id.
40. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
41. Waiver can be express or implied. Because an express waiver by the person enti-
tled to protection will rarely be at issue, the term "waiver" throughout this Article refers
to an implied waiver.
42. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 5-6.
43. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622-23 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1655 (1989).
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was made selectively to the government and not to Pollard, and that
many courts recognize selective waivers of work-product. 47 By do-
ing so, the court treated the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine as if their purposes were identical, and reached an
impractical result far broader than the case required.48
1. Partial Disclosure.-A disclosure of any information covered
by the attorney-client privilege results in what is commonly called a
"subject matter waiver."49 Under this doctrine, a partial disclosure
waives the privilege not only with respect to the material disclosed
but also with respect to related information that was withheld.50
The basis for the extended waiver is one of fairness; because the
disclosed information in isolation will normally be favorable to the
privileged party, it would be unfair to deprive an opponent of the
opportunity to undermine the limits of the waiver by exploring the
context of the disclosure." 1
This rationale of fairness applies equally to work-product
materials. In United States v. Nobles,52 the Supreme Court held that,
although an investigative report was protected by the work-product
doctrine, once the investigator testified the protection was waived
with respect to the subject of the investigator's testimony.53 The
Supreme Court limited the application of its holding in a critical
footnote:
47. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
48. Martin Marietta's expansion of the waiver doctrine joins the pattern of court deci-
sions that is neither consistent nor easily summarized. Some courts have properly fo-
cused on the purposes to be served by the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine, while others focus solely on the fairness of the limited disclosure to achieve a
desired result. One line of cases holds that disclosure of some material results in the
loss of the privilege with respect to related, undisclosed documents and information. In
reJohn Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1982); Permian Corp. v. United States,
665 F.2d 1214, 1219-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (any voluntary breach of attorney-client privi-
leged information waives the privilege as to all communications on the same subject).
Another line of cases limits the waiver to the actual documents or information disclosed,
unless palpable unfairness results. See In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102-03 (2d Cir.
1987) (disclosure of privileged attorney-client communications does not extend to other
conversations on the same subject); United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (waiver limited to the information disclosed during a settlement discus-
sion; where the party attacking the privilege was not prejudiced, and there were no
grounds for a finding of waiver, there is no reason to find a waiver by implication).
49. Comment, supra note 44, at 1633.
50. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1655 (1989);J. GERGACZ, supra note 29, 5.02[2][a][2], at 5-15 to 5-16 & n.50; Com-
ment, supra note 44, at 1633.
51. See Comment, supra note 44, at 1633-34.
52. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
53. Id. at 239.
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What constitutes a waiver with respect to work-product
materials depends, of course, upon the circumstances.
Counsel necessarily makes use throughout trial of the
notes, documents, and other internal materials prepared to
present adequately his client's case, and often relies on
them in examining witnesses. When so used, there nor-
mally is no waiver. But where, as here, counsel attempts to
make a testimonial use of these materials the normal rules
of evidence come into play with respect to cross-examina-
tion and production of documents.'
"The circumstances" were central to the Nobles decision. An in-
vestigator for the defendant had interviewed two witnesses called by
the government at trial.55 On cross-examination, both witnesses ac-
knowledged being interviewed but each denied making statements
that defense counsel knew were described in his investigator's re-
port.56 The government requested that the report be disclosed, but
the trial court initially declined to order its production.57 When the
defense called the investigator as its witness for the purpose of im-
peaching the testimony of the two government witnesses, the court
conditioned permitting such testimony on the production of the re-
port. 8 The Supreme Court held that the trial court's action was
permissible.59 The crucial aspect of Nobles was the testimonial use at
trial of the otherwise protected work-product material and the re-
sulting unfairness of a one-sided presentation of evidence to a fact-
finder.
Relying on Nobles, the Fourth Circuit found that Martin Mari-
etta's submission of the position paper to the United States Attor-
ney during pre-indictment settlement discussions constituted
"testimonial use."'" After characterizing the pre-indictment negoti-
ations as "proceedings,"'" the court grounded its conclusion on
three factors: (1) the adversarial nature of the negotiations; (2) Mar-
tin Marietta's express assurance of the completeness of the disclo-
sures; and (3) Martin Marietta's intent to settle the controversy.6 2
The court did not mention that settlement disclosures are not testi-
54. Id. at 239 n.14.
55. Id. at 227.
56. Id. at 227-28.
57. Id. at 228.
58. Id. at 229.
59. Id. at 239-41.
60. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1655 (1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. The third factor appears to be inherent in the other two.
924 [VOL. 49:917
ATrORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK-PRODUCT
monial in any evidentiary sense. It also ignored the fact that the
position paper was inadmissible as proof for a variety of reasons,
including the government's express agreement that it would not be
used as evidence against Martin Marietta or Pollard,6  and the fact
that it would be inadmissible as hearsay.
Regardless of whether the Martin Marietta disclosure consti-
tuted testimonial use, it clearly did not invoke the fairness problems
of Nobles. In Nobles the Supreme Court made it clear that it was rec-
ognizing a waiver of work-product protection solely on the basis of
fairness implicated by a one-sided presentation of evidence to a fact-
finder.' The settlement context does not invoke such fairness con-
cerns because the government can reject the target's proffer regard-
less of the amount of information disclosed, and it can pursue
charges of obstruction of justice if the target intentionally provides
misleading information.65 More to the point, the government can
demand complete disclosure before drawing any conclusions from a
proffer, but a jury can make no such demands during a trial. In the
settlement context there is no danger of unfairly misleading the ulti-
mate fact-finder. In short, the unique considerations that underlie
judicially created waivers do not exist outside the courtroom. The
differences in context between a partial disclosure in a settlement
negotiation and one made at trial render Nobles inapposite for the
purpose of finding a subject-matter waiver in the Martin Marietta
context.
2. Selective Disclosure.-The Martin Marietta court did not dis-
cuss the fact that the position paper was disclosed to the govern-
ment and not to Pollard, despite the fact that it was Pollard who was
seeking information.' As is mentioned above, most courts con-
63. See Letter from George BeaUl, supra note 13.
64. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239-40. In Nobles, the Court acknowledged its previous recog-
nition of the power of a court to require the prosecution to produce previously recorded
statements by government trial witnesses in order to facilitate truth-finding. Id. at 231;
seeJencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). This power is now authorized by stat-
ute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988). There is no concomitant statutory requirement re-
garding previously recorded statements by defense witnesses. However, Nobles suggests
that such statements are subject to production. 422 U.S. at 241. Cf. Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (reaching the same conclu-
sion without reference to Nobles).
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988) (providing for fine of up to $5000 or imprisonment
up to 5 years, or both, for anyone who "corruptly... influences, obstructs or impedes
... the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is
being had before any department or agency of the United States").
66. Disclosure was also made to Pollard, see supra note 22 and accompanying text;
this fact, however, was not considered by the court.
1990] 925
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clude that a selective disclosure of confidential communications to
one person results in a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to all
other persons because the underlying purpose of confidentiality is
destroyed.67 On the other hand, many courts, including the Fourth
Circuit, recognize a limited waiver for selective disclosure of work-
product.68
In In re Doe,69 the Fourth Circuit recognized that the purpose of
the work-product doctrine is to shield an attorney's work from ad-
verse parties.7 ° It also recognized that some disclosures which do
not reach an adversary do not contravene the purpose of the doc-
trine.71  For example, disclosures between joint defendants have
been recognized as appropriate limited waivers.72 Consequently,
the Doe Court adopted the generally accepted test that "to effect a
forfeiture of work product protection by waiver, disclosure must oc-
cur in circumstances in which the attorney cannot reasonably expect
to limit the future use of the otherwise protected material. ' 7'  The
court also clearly implicated the purpose behind the protection by
stating that the waiver is effective when the disclosure circumstances
67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has argued
against such a blanket rule based on the same rationale by which courts permit a selec-
tive disclosure of work-product. Comment, supra note 44, at 1648.
68. E.g., In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Disclosure to a person with
an intereft common to that of the attorney or the client normally is not inconsistent with
an intent to invoke the work product doctrine's protection and would not amount to
such a waiver."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (purpose of work-product is to protect
material from an opposing party in litigation, not necessarily from the rest of the world
generally); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(waiver exists only if disclosure substantially increases the possibility that the opposing
party could obtain the information disclosed). See generally E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN,
supra note 30, at 164; J. GERGACZ, supra note 29, 7.02[3][c][iii] (cases are split on the
issue); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 209-10
(1970 & Supp. 1990).
69. 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
70. Id. at 1077.
71. Id. at 1081.
72. E.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.) (recognizing at-
torney-client privilege for statements made in confidence to attorney for codefendant
for common purpose), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); Hunydee v. United States, 355
F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (same). This exception to the general waiver theory is
recognized because joint defendants have a common interest in concealing the work-
product from their common opponent and because the limited sharing of privileged
information does not discourage full and frank client communication to the attorney.
See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (recognizing joint defend-
ant exception because communication between codefendants was confidential, con-
cerned common issues, and was intended to facilitate representation in SEC
investigation).
73. Doe, 662 F.2d at 1081.
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increase the possibility that an opponent will obtain and use the
material.74
Applied to the Martin Marietta facts, this test yields a new result.
Martin Marietta disclosed its position paper to the government, not
to Pollard. 75 Although the company did disclose to an opponent, its
position at the time was that Pollard was the only culpable party.
Therefore, to Martin Marietta Pollard was in theory an opponent
also. In this context, the company took the extraordinary step of
exacting from the government an agreement that the information
would remain protected from disclosure to Pollard. Consequently,
following the Doe test, the circumstances of the disclosure did not
increase the possibility that Pollard would obtain the material. 76
In sum, it was critical that the selectiveness of the disclosure be
considered. Although it would have had no effect on the outcome
concerning the attorney-client privilege, it would certainly have af-
fected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion on work-product under its
own precedent as well as under the policy that supports the
doctrine.
3. The Context of the Request.-The preceding two sections fo-
cused on the context of the disclosure-that is, how much was dis-
closed and to whom the disclosures were made. Equally important
is the context of the request. In Martin Marietta, Pollard employed a
subpoena in advance of trial. While it is not required that the ob-
jects of such a subpoena actually be used in evidence, the subpoena
must reflect a good-faith effort to obtain evidence.77 It is not to be
used in a "fishing expedition to see what may turn up. '"78
Pollard's justification for seeking attorney work-product was, in
essence, that the attorneys' material might show "a company-wide
74. Id. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 68, § 2024, at 209-10.
75. See Letter from George Beall, supra note 13.
76. Note that this mechanistic approach raises additional questions of fairness.
Here, the disclosure tended to deflect blame from the company and onto Pollard, who
claimed that fairness required that he be fully informed as to the disclosures and under-
lying data in order that he might raise a proper defense. While this clearly made an
impression on the Fourth Circuit in Martin Marietta, see 856 F.2d at 622, it is in essence a
circular argument. If selective disclosure of work-product is permissible, see Doe, 662
F.2d at 1081, it might have been fair to deprive Pollard of information that he could not
have obtained if no disclosure had been made. Furthermore, even if the government
had relied upon Martin Marietta's representations concerning Pollard, it still had to
present evidence of Pollard's guilt in order to obtain a conviction. At trial, Pollard
would have to respond to this proof rather than to the company's representations.




conspiracy to defraud the Defense Department, as well as identify
the members of such conspiracy." 79 In short, it was a fishing expedi-
tion: if there was a company-wide conspiracy that included Pollard,
it would hardly exonerate him.
Much of what Pollard sought could have been obtained without
looking to privileged or protected information. For example, the
data underlying the internal audit and the facts contained in the wit-
ness statements were not protected or privileged.80 Pollard could
have conducted his own audit of the data and could have inter-
viewed the same witnesses. Although it would be inconvenient to
do such work, "considerations of convenience do not overcome the
policies served by the attorney-client privilege"'" or by the work-
product doctrine. 2 Pollard had an opportunity to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent of most of the material described in the sub-
poena, and that opportunity was not altered by Martin Marietta's
disclosures to the government. Thus, a balancing of the character
of the disclosure against the policies underlying the protections
does not necessarily support a rule of absolute waiver.8"
In addition, the timing of Pollard's request and the procedural
device used must be scrutinized. Pollard sought the source material
for the position paper through a pretrial subpoena. In order to be
discoverable under rule 17(c), 4 the requested materials must meet
the three-pronged United States v. Nixon 5 test: they must be specific,
79. United States v. Pollard, Crim. No. Y-87-0142 (D. Md. 1990) (updated Memo-
randum Opinion considering motion to compel discovery), reprinted in, Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 22a-23a.
80. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) ("The privilege
only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the under-
lying facts by those who communicated with the attorney ... .
81. Id. at 396.
82. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947) (when seeking oral statements
made by witnesses to opposing counsel, a lawyer's stated reasons "to help prepare him-
self to examine witnesses and to make sure he has overlooked nothing" were not
enough to compel production).
83. Using similar reasoning, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a limited waiver
should be recognized in certain circumstances. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). Meredith involved a selective disclosure to the SEC of
materials covered by the attorney-client privilege. Id. The court's reasoning, however,
was flawed to the extent that it ignored the fact that the disclosure reflects a desire to
waive confidentiality. A similar disclosure of work-product does not reflect a desire to
disclose the materials to a subsequent adversary. Thus, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning,
when enlightened by the purposes behind the protections, could support a limited
waiver of work-product protection in selective disclosure circumstances, but it does not
provide a basis for less than an absolute waiver of attorney-client privilege.
84. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). For the text of the rule, see supra note 19.
85. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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relevant, and admissible.16 The Fourth Circuit did not pause long
in finding that Pollard's subpoena met the Nixon standard. Although
the material sought was of doubtful admissibility, the court found
that only a "good faith" effort need be made to obtain evidence, and
that the subpoenaed materials were "of evidentiary value" and
hence were properly sought under a rule 17(c) subpoena.87
In sum, the context of a request for information is important to
a proper evaluation of a waiver analysis. Material sought pursuant
to rule 17(c) must be admissible and relevant-work-product such
as attorney notes and memoranda are generally neither.
C. The Content of the Requested Material
The second striking aspect of the Martin Marietta opinion is that
it significantly alters the definition of work-product, seemingly in
derogation of Hickman v. Taylor,8 the Supreme Court's seminal
opinion on the subject.
In Hickman, the Supreme Court established a work-product doc-
trine that shields from discovery "all written materials obtained or
prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation."89
Among the materials sought in Hickman were written statements
signed by witnesses and the essence of other witness interviews as
memorialized by counsel. Both of these classes of materials were
afforded protection because "[p]roper preparation of a client's case
demands that [the attorney] assemble information, sift what he con-
siders to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal
theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interfer-
ence. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements,
[and] memoranda .... 90
Both classes, however, were not given equal protection. Writ-
ten statements either drafted or adopted by witnesses were viewed
as deserving of less protection because they might be admissible in
evidence under certain circumstances or they might be useful to the
adversary for impeachment or corroboration. 9' Consequently, the
Supreme Court suggested that a trial court should order such writ-
86. See id. at 699-700.
87. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1655 (1989).
88. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).





ten statements produced upon a showing of necessity.92 Because an
attorney's memorandum that merely captures the essence of the
statements made in an interview has no direct impeachment or cor-
roborative value, and because such attorney writings reveal an attor-
ney's mental processes, they are afforded significantly greater
protection.9" This difference between written statements and attor-
neys' memoranda is commonly recognized, and materials that the
attorney obtains, such as signed or adopted written statements, are
known as nonopinion work-product; materials the lawyer prepares,
such as notes and memoranda, are categorized as opinion work-
product.94
The line between the two became blurred by the Fourth Circuit
in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.95 At issue were several docu-
ments prepared by the defendant's former attorneys in connection
with prior litigation.96 One such document had apparently been
disclosed and the plaintiffs sought all such earlier work-product on a
broad theory of subject-matter waiver. 97 In affirming the district
court's rejection of this theory, the Fourth Circuit quoted Nobles, but
went on to state: "Thus, it is true that Nobles, which dealt solely with
Hickman-type witness statements as opposed to opinion work prod-
uct, held that the privilege derived from the work product doctrine
92. Id. at 511-12.
93. Id. at 511-13.
94. Cohn, supra note 29, at 932-33. See generally Annotation, Protection from Discovery of
Attorney's Opinion Work Product Under Rule 26(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 84
A.L.R. FED. 779 (1987).
95. 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976). The district court, in a pre-Nobles opinion, went
as far as to state: "There are obviously degrees of mental impression." Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1199 (D.S.C. 1974) (emphasis in original).
The district court described a continuum of recorded opinion work-product, with crea-
tive legal thought at the more-protected end and observed fact at the less-protected end.
Id. at 1199-1200. Such a discrimination defies the reasoning in Hickman and ignores the
reality that even the selection and manner of recording observed facts reveals creative
legal thought:
It seems clear that [a lawyer's notebooks] are indeed "work product" in an
essential sense of the term. They are counsel's ordering of the "facts," refer-
ring to the prospective proofs, organizing, aligning, and marshaling empirical
data with the view to combative employment that is the hallmark of the adver-
sary enterprise.
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
96. 540 F.2d at 1218-19. Most of the documents actually were prepared by a French
conseil en brevets, whom the court described as "not a lawyer" but a patent agent. Id. at
1218-19 & n.3; see also infra note 102 (significance of lawyer-investigator distinction).
For the prior litigation, see Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509
F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
97. See Duplan, 540 F.2d at 1222.
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is not in all cases absolute."9
The basic problem with the reference to "Hickman-type witness
statements" is that it misclassifies the document at issue in Nobles as
nonopinion work-product. Hickman involved two types of witness
statements: Adopted written statements and memorialized oral
statements. The latter are classified as opinion work-product. 99
The document at issue in Nobles was an investigator's report contain-
ing witness interviews that "preserved the essence of those conver-
sations in a written report."'" There is no indication that the
report contained verbatim witness statements or that the contents of
the report had been adopted by the witnesses. 0 ' Consequently, ac-
cording to Hickman such a memorandum containing only the es-
sence of an interview reveals mental processes and impressions and
it should be classified as opinion work-product. 10 2
This misclassification is carried forward into Martin Marietta,
where the Fourth Circuit relied upon its earlier Duplan decision for
the proposition that "Nobles dealt with non-opinion work-prod-
uct."'0° The Martin Marietta court added, "We realize that non-
opinion work product necessarily will be reflective of a counsel's ap-
proach .... ,104 The court apparently ignored the language in Hick-
man that drew an opinion work-product distinction for attorneys'
memoranda because such memoranda reveal more about the attor-
ney's views of the case than what the witness actually said.' 0 5 In-
deed, a good pretrial interview of a witness will reflect a litigator's
inferences, hypotheticals, theory of the case, and strategy for cross-
examination. In other words, material is opinion work-product be-
98. Id. at 1223.
99. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
100. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 227 (1975).
101. See id. (investigator merely preserved the essence of the conversation in a report).
102. The Duplan court apparently did not mean to classify the Nobles report as nonopi-
nion work-product because it was written by an investigator rather than an attorney. In
fact, the court acknowledged that opinion work-product immunity could apply equally to
nonlawyers. Duplan, 540 F.2d at 1219. Clearly, this lawyer-nonlawyer distinction was
rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis for denying protection.
One of [the realities of litigation] is that attorneys often must rely on the assist-
ance of investigators and the agents in the compilation of materials in prepara-
tion for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect materials
prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney
himself.
Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39.
103. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1655 (1989).
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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cause it is "reflective of a counsel's approach. '"1 °"
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Hickman distinction in
Upjohn Co. v. United States:10 7 "Forcing an attorney to disclose notes
and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is particularly disfa-
vored because it tends to reveal the attorney's mental processes. ' 08
Jn its discussion of the enhanced protection afforded to materials
that reflect an attorney's theories, Upjohn relied upon Nobles.' °9
Inexplicably, the Fourth Circuit failed to mention Upjohn in the Mar-
tin Marietta decision. It is difficult to understand how the Fourth
Circuit could have ignored the Supreme Court's most recent pro-
nouncement on both the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine, especially given the similarity of facts in the two
cases.
The Upjohn Company, like Martin Marietta, retained outside
counsel to conduct an internal investigation that included sending a
questionnaire to certain employees.1 o Outside counsel conducted
interviews of these and other employees, which generated notes and
memoranda. I As a result of the investigation, Upjohn submitted a
report to the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing its
conclusion that the legality of certain payments made to foreign
government officials was questionable."' The district court con-
cluded that a subsequent government subpoena for materials, in-
cluding the interview notes and memoranda, should be enforced
because any applicable protection had been waived."l 3 The Sixth
Circuit disagreed." 4 Although the Supreme Court did not reach
the issue of waiver, it clearly considered internal investigation
materials, such as those the Fourth Circuit classified as nonopinion
work-product, to be opinion work-product "entitled to special
protection."' 15
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court also rejected the "control-group
test"" 6 for determining the application of attorney-client privilege,
106. Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 625.
107. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
108. Id. at 399.
109. Id. at 398-99.
110. Id. at 386-87.
111. See id. at 387-88, 397.
112. Id. at 387-88.
113. See id. at 388.
114. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'don
other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
115. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.
116. A federal district judge in Pennsylvania first outlined the control-group test:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in
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and held that relevant communications from any employee are privi-
leged." 7 Applying this rule to the Martin Marietta facts yields the
conclusion that no nonopinion work-product was involved. Because
only employees were interviewed during the internal investigation,
any document that revealed communications implicated the attor-
ney-client privilege. The remainder of the material constituted
opinion work-product. As the Court in Upjohn stated:
The notes and memoranda sought by the Government
here, however, are work product based on oral statements.
If they reveal communications, they are, in this case, pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they
do not reveal communications, they reveal the attorneys'
mental processes in evaluating the communications.'""
Thus, to the extent that Martin Marietta classifies notes and memo-
randa as nonopinion work-product, it is in conflict with Upjohn. It
seems beyond dispute that Martin Marietta's position paper dis-
closed only attorney-client communications and opinion work-
product.
In sum, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on its earlier misreading of
Nobles and its apparent disregard of Upjohn resulted in a unique and
questionable definition of nonopinion work-product. This new defi-
nition permitted the court to classify improperly documents reflect-
ing attorney mental processes as nonopinion work-product, and to
hold that this less-protected class should be disclosed. Under
proper analysis, the documents should have been classified as opin-
ion work-product entitled to the same heightened protection that
the Fourth Circuit afforded to other materials in this class.' '9 At the
same time, it is critical to understand that the opinion-nonopinion
a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he
is an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply.
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus
denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 943 (1963). See generally J. GERGACZ, supra note 29, 3.02[3][a)[i] (discussing
the development and criticisms of the control-group test); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consid-
eration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 449-56 (1982) (trac-
ing the history of the test); Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 481-84 (1987) (same).
117. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-97. See J. GERGACZ, supra note 29, at V 3.02[3][b] (dis-
cussing current Supreme Court tests).
118. Id. at 401.




distinction was drawn in Hickman en route to the conclusion that a
court could order disclosure of the less-protected nonopinion
materials upon a showing of necessity;' 20 the distinction had noth-
ing to do with waiver.
D. A Synthesis of Errors
The key issue in Martin Marietta was whether and to what extent
protections were waived. The Fourth Circuit incorrectly distin-
guished between classes of work-product when the only relevant
distinction was between materials covered by attorney-client privi-
lege and those covered by the work-product protection. As dis-
cussed above, waiver analysis must focus on the purpose behind
these protections. A waiver of the attorney-client privilege includes
the communication disclosed and all other communications relating
to the same subject matter. 12 ' Furthermore, disclosure to one
waives as to all others. 22 Consequently, since confidentiality was
breached by Martin Marietta's disclosure of the position paper, Pol-
lard should have been granted access to any verbatim employee
statement within this description.
With regard to work-product, the Fourth Circuit held on the
facts of Martin Marietta that subject-matter waiver should apply to
nonopinion work-product but not to opinion work-product.' 2 3 This
holding, however, was premised on a misapprehension that the
Supreme Court in Nobles permitted access only to nonopinion work-
product.' 2 4 In fact, Nobles stands for the proposition that even opin-
ion work-product is not exempt from subject-matter waiver when
concerns of fairness outweigh the purpose for protecting the materi-
als.' 25 In Nobles, the balance tipped in favor of fairness because the
defense proffered a limited, potentially inaccurate version of certain
facts at trial. It would have been equally unfair if the selective dis-
closure had come from an adopted witness statement or from an
attorney's notes.
In Martin Marietta, the disclosure was not before a fact-finder; it
120. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) ("Where relevant and non-privi-
leged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is
essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had.").
121. United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally Com-
ment, supra note 44, at 1633.
122. See supra notes 50 & 67 and accompanying text.
123. 856 F.2d at 625-26.
124. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
125. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239-40 (1975);J. GERGACZ, supra note
29, 7.02[21[a][i], at 7-27 & n.120.
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was an attorney proffer made in confidential settlement negotia-
tions. Nor could the position paper qualify as evidence that the gov-
ernment could use in a trial of Pollard. Consequently, it is not clear
that fairness, under the principles in Nobles and Upjohn, should result
in a subject-matter waiver and required production of notes and
memoranda.
Martin Marietta sought certiorari, and the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) joined as amicus. 126 In its amicus brief, the ABA stated:
"The Fourth Circuit's decision creates substantial uncertainty con-
cerning both the existence and the scope of the implied waivers of
the attorney-client and work-product privileges. This uncertainty in
the law significantly impairs the ability of lawyers to provide respon-
sible, effective legal representation ... .'27 The Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari on April 3, 1989.128
Given this dramatic change in the rules concerning disclosure
of the details of internal corporate investigations, uncertainty now
pervades the domain of outside corporate counsel. It has been sug-
gested that the government itself now will be seeking to invoke the
Martin Marietta waiver rule in an effort to obtain underlying docu-
mentation from internal investigations, 29 and it will have little in-
centive to accept a written submission from defense counsel on
terms that will allow continued invocation of attorney-client or
work-product protection.
III. THE DREXEL BURNHAM PROBLEM
At the same time the appellate courts were considering Martin
Marietta, a similar drama was unfolding in Manhattan. In anticipa-
tion of extensive litigation surrounding allegations of securities
fraud, Drexel Burnham Lambert hired outside counsel to conduct
an internal investigation."' 0 The information generated was used by
Drexel's attorneys to outline the status and merits of the investiga-
tion in response to the standard audit inquiry letter submitted to the
company's auditors.'
126. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1655 (1989) (mem.).
127. Motion for Leave to File a Brief and Brief of the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition at 2, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1655 (No. 88-1157).
128. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1655.
129. Bennett, Rauh & Kriegel, The Role of Internal Investigations in Defending Against
Charges of Corporate Misconduct 415, 444, A.B.A. NAT'L INST., WHrTE COLLAR CRIME
(1990).




Federal prosecutors issued a grand jury subpoena to Drexel's
outside counsel for the results of the internal investigation, includ-
ing the lawyer's interview notes.1 32 The outside counsel resisted on
the ground that the materials were covered by attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product protection. 133 In a sealed opinion, Senior
United States District Judge Edmund L. Palmieri held two promi-
nent Wall Street lawyers in contempt and ordered that some of the
materials be produced, apparently on the theory that the company
had waived protections by disclosing the results of the investigation
to the outside auditors.134 This is believed to be the first time a
court imputed a subject-matter waiver from the submission of a
standard audit inquiry letter.
Although the opinion remains sealed, it has generated enor-
mous concern among members of the corporate defense bar.13 5
The concern springs from the recognition that a candid assessment
of potential liability included in a response to an auditor's request
may waive protection of most, if not all, of the results of an internal
investigation. 3 6 The defense bar's concern also stems from Judge
Palmieri's revisitation of an issue presumed settled.
In 1976, the American Bar Association issued a statement of
policy regarding the appropriate scope of a lawyer's response to a
potential-liability request by a corporate client's outside auditors.1
3 7
The policy recommends a limited response that covers only items
that are "material to the presentation of the client's financial state-
ments,"'' 13 but it also suggests that the response carry a disclaimer
that it is intentionally being limited pursuant to the ABA guide-
lines. 3 9 It is apparent that such a disclosure still would serve as a
waiver as to the statements actually disclosed and, under the Fourth
Circuit's expansive interpretation of the subject-matter waiver the-
ory, '4 as to all client communications related to the areas classified
as material.




135. Id.; Strasser, Corporate Probe Use Expanding, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 9, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
136. A failure to respond completely to an auditor's request will likely result in a qual-
ified opinion of the company's financial condition, which has a detrimental effect on the
value of public stock.
137. American Bar Association, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Audi-
tors' Requests for Information, 31 Bus. LAw. 1709 (1976) [hereinafter ABA Policy].
138. Id. at 1712.
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28, 64-65.
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press consent from the client before responding, 4 ' and the most
recent auditing interpretation by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants suggests that the consent letter contain a clear
statement of intent to retain attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection despite the pending disclosure to outside audi-
tors.' 42 This manual also suggests that the response to the auditors
say that disclosure should not be construed as a waiver.' 43
In light of recent case law, it is doubtful that any court would
value such a disclaimer. Courts apparently find a lack of intent to
waive protection only upon a showing that the disclosure was inad-
vertent 14 4 or compelled by a court. 14 5 One court has recognized a
waiver of attorney-client privilege based upon such a specific reser-
vation made at the point of disclosure; however, a key to the court's
conclusion was the fact that the disclosure was made in the context
of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation that had not
advanced to the point of public proceedings.1 46 Because a disclo-
sure to an outside auditor concerning potential or pending litigation
is made for the purpose of completing financial statements to be
used in the credit market and in reports to shareholders, there can
be no expectation that the information will remain confidential with
the auditor. But it is equally certain that none of the participants in
this process has any expectation that the underlying material-most
especially lawyer's notes-will be subject to an implied waiver of
privilege and expected protection.
A corporation is thus placed in a dilemma. It must conduct the
internal investigation if litigation is anticipated and it must also dis-
close its potential for liability to the credit market. But to do both
vitiates any claim of privilege with regard to the heart, if not all, of
the results of the investigation. The dilemma should not cause cor-
141. ABA Policy, supra note 137, at 1716.
142. 1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Professional Stan-
dards (CCH) AU §§ 9337.28-.30 (May 1990).
143. Id. § 9337.30.
144. Cf. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 573
F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1978) (leaving open possibility that inadvertent disclosure might
not constitute waiver).
145. See, e.g., Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1988)
(where a district court compels disclosure of privileged communications that plaintiffs
use at trial, defendants do not automatically waive their privilege by attempting to use
some communications to demonstrate good faith reliance on counsel's advice), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 2064 (1989); Transamerica Computer, 573 F.2d at 650-51 (parties agreed
that "a party does not waive the attorney-client privilege for documents which he is
compelled to produce" (emphasis in original)).
146. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp.
638, 642-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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porations to avoid internal investigations for the obvious reasons
that litigation cannot be avoided or won without them. On the
other hand, as the ABA policy statement acknowledges: "It is also
recognized that our legal, political and economic systems depend to
an important extent on public confidence in published financial
statements. To meet this need the accounting profession must
adopt and adhere to standards and procedures that will command
confidence in the auditing process." 47 Consequently, corporations
can neither forgo an investigation nor conceal the results from
outside auditors without incurring some loss. Because they cannot
do both without potentially waiving the privilege, corporations must
weigh the value of confidentiality in litigation against the negative
fallout that can be expected from a qualified opinion of financial sta-
tus in an auditor's statement.
The benefits to the economic and political systems of public
confidence in published financial statements could provide a basis
for changing the analysis of waiver. The recognition and waiver of
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection occur on a
case-by-case basis,' 4 ' and the analysis must take into account the
purposes underlying the protections.' 49
Courts should evaluate each case involving disclosure to an
outside auditor to determine if the company claiming the privilege
seeks to use it in a way that is inconsistent with its purpose.'50 Be-
cause the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to foster candor
by maintaining the confidentiality of communications,' waivers
should be implied only after analysis of the context of the communi-
cation. Disclosure for the purpose of a financial statement is clearly
inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality and does not foster
candor when public disclosure is a near certainty.' 52
The purpose of work-product protection, on the other hand, is
to advance the adversary system by protecting the attorney's work in
order to promote thorough preparation and presentation of each
147. ABA Policy, supra note 137, at 1710.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles 422 U.S. 225, 239 n.14 (1975) (reprinted supra at
text accompanying note 54).
149. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
150. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (when the corporation
disclosed information to the SEC, it impliedly waived its claim of work-product protec-
tion as to documents clearly noted as material to the investigation).
151. See supra note 30.
152. See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir.) (IRS agent's
testimony was admissible although the taxpayer claimed he only submitted information




side of a case.' 53 Because the information conveyed in audit inquiry
letters invariably becomes public, the issue of an opponent's prepa-
ration is irrelevant, at least to the extent of the published informa-
tion. But a subject-matter waiver is not necessarily demanded in
this context because subject-matter waiver is driven by concerns of
fairness. As is illustrated by Nobles, shielding undisclosed results of
an internal investigation involving the same subject matter as is dis-
closed is not unfair to an opponent unless the partial disclosure is
used as evidence in a formal proceeding.' Wholly different con-
cerns apply in the nonadversarial context of audit inquiry letter dis-
closures.' 55 Consequently, the disclosure to an outside auditor
should not result in subject-matter waiver as to work-product.
IV. THE FISCHETrl AND GOLDBERGER CASE
In recent months the Department of Justice has fueled the de-
bate over access to once-sacrosanct information by aggressively
seeking the identity of cash-paying clients of lawyers. The general
rule is that fee information is a nonconfidential communication and
thus unprivileged.'- 6 Several courts, however, have labored to es-
tablish narrow exceptions to the rule-for example, when such dis-
closure would supply the "last link" in an existing chain of
incriminating evidence; 1' 7 when disclosure would implicate the cli-
ent in the very matter for which legal advice was sought initially;' 58
153. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
154. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 236-40.
155. See supra text following note 146.
156. E.g., In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that absent special
circumstances, client identification and fee information are not privileged); In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger and Marenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.
1982) (fee information not generally considered part of the exception to the noncon-
fidentiality rule); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (Former
5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 538 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976). See generally Stem & Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1798-1800
(1988); Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Federal GrandJury: Client's Identity and
Fee Arrangements, 13 AM. J. CaIM. L. 67, 67-68 (1985).
157. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960); Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027.
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA), 899 F.2d 1039, 1044 (11 th Cir. 1990)
("last link" doctrine is inapplicable when disclosure would not reveal privileged commu-
nications, motive, or strategy).
158. See In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Cherney), 898 F.2d 565, 568 (1990) (disclosure
of the identity of a client who sought advice on his involvement in a conspiracy "would
necessarily reveal the client's involvement in that crime and thus reveal his motive for
seeking legal advice in the first place," and his identity was privileged because it was an
integral part of a confidential communication); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548
F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1977) (although disclosure of a client's identity might im-
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and when disclosure would be tantamount to disclosing an other-
wise protected confidential communication.' 5 9 But a sudden and
recent surge of interest by the government in pursuing client fee
information, driven by the greatly increased attention being devoted
to the forfeiture and money-laundering aspects of narcotics traffick-
ing, has greatly troubled the criminal defense bar. 6° The resent-
ment is due more to the criminal combatants' common
understanding that such information was confidential rather than
the defense bar's unilateral view that it was privileged. The end of
the informal truce is manifested by the government's greatly in-
creased use of compulsion to obtain client fee information from
attorneys. 161
The compulsion process has used both the vehicles of grand
jury subpoenas and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative
subpoenas. Before issuing a grand jury subpoena to an attorney for
client information, a federal prosecutor must obtain written ap-
proval from the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Divi-
sion.' 62 The information sought must be unprivileged, necessary,
and not obtainable from any other source.16 3 But requests for au-
thority to issue grand jury subpoenas to lawyers are routinely
granted--640 such subpoenas were issued in 1989, and the number
is rising. 164
The IRS recently has entered this arena. The 1984 Deficit Re-
duction Act added section 60501 to the Internal Revenue Code. 65
Under its provisions, any person engaged in a trade or business who
receives more than $10,000 in cash in one transaction 6 6 is required
plicate him in a conspiracy, the government may still compel disclosure by establishing a
prima facie case that his attorney was retained to promote intended or continuing crimi-
nal or fraudulent activity).
159. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965); see also Stern & Hoffman,
supra note 156, at 1798-99 (discussing rationales behind the exceptions); Comment,
supra note 156, at 69 & nn.5-7 (additional cases).
160. See, e.g., Brodsky, An Attorney's Obligation to Identify Clients Who Pay Cash Fees,
N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
161. See ABA Takes Positions on Lawyer Subpoenas, Rights of Death Row Inmates, Abortion, 46
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1436, 1437 (Feb. 21, 1990) [hereinafter ABA Position].
162. See UNITED STATES AT-rORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161(a)D (1988).
163. Id. § 9-2.161(a)E. For criticism of an earlier version of these rules, see Note, A
Critical Appraisal of the Justice Department Guidelines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense
Attorneys, 1986 DUKE L.J. 145.
164. ABA Position, supra note 161, at 1437 (reporting on speech by the President of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
165. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 146, 98 Stat. 494, 685-87 (1984) (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1988)).
166. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.60501-IT (requiring the reporting of cash transac-
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to provide to the IRS certain information about the transaction, in-
cluding the identity of the payor. 16 7 Since November 1988, willful
failure to file the form is a felony punishable by imprisonment for up
to 5 years and a fine of $25,000, or in the case of a corporation,
$100,000."' There is also a civil penalty for intentional failure to
file: ten percent of the amount which should have been reported, or
ten percent of the taxable income derived from the transaction.' 69
Law firms clearly come within the coverage of section 60501.
Designed to root out drug dealers' money-laundering activities, this
reporting requirement was immediately resisted by criminal defense
lawyers, who argued that such disclosure might incriminate their
clients. ' 70
A number of defense attorneys who received such fees in cash
adopted the stratagem of reporting the transactions on the required
form by describing the amount of cash, and the date and nature of
the transactions, but declining to provide the names, addresses, and
taxpayer identification numbers of the payors' 7 1 as required by the
statute. 72 In October 1989, after the Justice Department and sev-
eral criminal defense bar groups failed to negotiate a compromise to
the dispute, the IRS sent letters seeking client identity information
to 956 lawyers who did not provide it on the reporting form.' 7 1 In
addition, the IRS issued administrative subpoenas to several law
tions from the same source that aggregate to over $10,000 within one year); Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.60501-1, 55 Fed. Reg. 28022, 28061 (1990).
167. 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1988). Two or more related transactions are treated as one
for reporting purposes. See also supra note 166.
168. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1988).
169. 26 U.S.C. § 6721(b)(1)(A) (1988).
170. Lawyers who represent certain types of criminals also have a much more mun-
dane concern. The government can restrain and obtain forfeiture of legal fees paid by
drug dealers to their lawyers if the fees can be traced to the proceeds of drug trafficking.
21 U.S.C. 99 853, 881(a)(6) (1988); United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2665
(1989) (holding that this statute authorized the district court to freeze defendant's assets
even if they were to be used to pay attorney); Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2646, 2652 (1989) (forfeiture statute's preventing payment of attorneys' fees did not
unduly burden defendant's sixth amendment rights). Legal fees can also be restrained
and forfeited if shown to be proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity under the
RICO statute, and the restraining of such potentially forfeitable sums can be effectuated
before trial, prior to any forfeiture order. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) (1988); United
States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Mansnerus, For Lawyers, Crime
May Not Pay, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, § 4, at 5, col. 1 (suggesting that fee-forfeiture
provisions drove at least one prominent criminal defense attorney away from drug
cases).
171. Brodsky, supra note 160.
172. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501(b) (1988).
173. Stille, Both Sides Claim Disclosure Win, Nat'l LJ., Mar. 26, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
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firms.'1 7 4 In November 1989, the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York moved to enforce the subpoenas
against two Manhattan law firms, Fischetti Pomerantz & Russo and
Goldberger & Dubin.175 The firms argued that the identities of the
clients were protected by the attorney-client privilege.' 76
The argument, in essence, followed the lines of the purpose be-
hind the privilege: if the client is connected with large amounts of
cash, the government will focus on the client's activities, and such a
possibility, initiated by the attorney's report to the government, will
chill the attorney-client relationship.17 7 The attorneys argued that
this harm outweighed the governmental interest in the information,
which they characterized as nothing more than a fishing expedi-
tion. 17 There is substantial case authority for the proposition that
lawyers can be compelled under grand jury subpoena to divulge in-
formation about client identity and fees. 1 7 9 But the lawyers for Fis-
chetti and Goldberger argued that those cases involved identified
defendants already under investigation, while the new IRS initiative
would force lawyers to divulge information about potential criminal
targets who have not yet aroused the government's suspicion.' 80
In a bench opinion issued on March 13, 1990, United States
District Judge Vincent Broderick granted the government's sub-
poena enforcement action.' 8 ' The court agreed with the govern-
ment's position that what was involved was a requirement of neutral
application and that attorneys were not singled out by the statute. 182
Judge Broderick found no privilege attached to the clients at issue in
the subpoena-they had already been indicted or brought to trial-
but did recognize the need for judicial review of individual circum-
stances and found that specific exceptions could be warranted upon
a proper showing of special circumstances. 8 3
The court was bound by Second Circuit law holding that, "ab-
sent special circumstances, client identity and fee information are
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Transcript of the March 13, 1990 proceedings in United States v. Fischetti Pomerantz
& Russo and United States v. Goldberger &Dubin, P.C. at 16-17 (S.D.N.Y.) (No. M-18-304)
[hereinafter Transcript] (copy on file with Mayland Law Review).
177. See id. at 16-17, 19, 35.
178. Id. at 18-19.
179. See supra note 156.
180. Stille, supra note 173.
181. Transcript, supra note 176, at 51.
182. Id. at 52.
183. Id. at 53.
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not privileged." ' 4 The rationale is that the client's identity and fee
information are not confidential and are not essential to obtain legal
advice.'8 5 The "special circumstances" caveat apparently springs
from Baird v. Koerner, ' 6 where the Ninth Circuit reversed an order
directing an attorney who had communicated with the IRS to dis-
close the clients' identities on the rationale that "the identification
... conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be
part of the usual privileged communication." 187
One commentator has traced three variations of the Baird ex-
ception and found the most widely accepted to be where the disclo-
sure of client identity or fee information would connect the client to
already-disclosed, independently privileged information.' Clearly
section 60501 does not implicate such an exception because it only
requires the reporting of the client's name and the portion of the fee
information that constitutes the cash payment.' 8 9 It also requires a
description of the transaction,1 90 but a description such as "fee for
legal advice" does not reveal the content of the advice, which is in-
dependently privileged. Furthermore, a reportable cash transaction
is not of itself evidence of criminal conduct, much less of guilt.
At bottom, the information should not be privileged because in
isolation it communicates nothing that necessarily is considered
confidential. The statute reflects the policy concern that large cash
transactions often are related to potentially harmful activity, and,
like weapons purchases, ought to be reported. The concerns of the
legal profession, voiced in the Fischetti-Goldberg case, could be ad-
dressed just as the Rules of Professional Conduct suggest for deal-
ing with other types of potential conflict.'' Lawyers should inform
clients who propose to pay a fee in cash that the transaction must be
reported. This will provide the clients with the opportunity to make
some other arrangement.' 92
184. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 247 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
185. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
186. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
187. Id. at 632-33.
188. Comment, supra note 44, at 1519-20.
189. 26 U.S.C. § 60501(b) (1988). The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to re-
quire other information. Id. § 6050I(b)(2)(D); see, e.g., supra note 166.
190. Id. § 60501(b)(2)(C).
191. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989).
192. There are limitations on alternate arrangements contained in the same statute,
which makes it illegal to structure a transaction in order to evade the reporting require-




Strong currents are reshaping trial lawyers' relationships with
their clients, and there is no indication that the waters are calming.
Martin Marietta is only the latest manifestation of a steady erosion of
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, but it has
accelerated the process dramatically.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Martin Marietta rests on an un-
stable foundation, and serious questions challenge the legitimacy of
several premises central to the decision-namely, whether facts
proffered in a settlement context should constitute disclosures such
that fairness dictates an implied waiver of the protection afforded all
undisclosed facts, and whether attorney notes and memoranda of
witness interviews can be viewed as nonopinion work-product. At
issue in the case was not the information actually revealed to oppos-
ing counsel, but rather undisclosed information. The arguments
that support the rule that a privilege cannot attach to disclosed doc-
uments and information do not support the corollary that protec-
tion should be lost for undisclosed, privileged documents and
information. Fairness concerns which suggest that a partial disclo-
sure might prove misleading in an adversarial setting can have little
application to a third party. But the opinion stands, and it can be
expected to raise havoc for trial lawyers: no longer can settlement
discussions be undertaken with no risk; no longer can counsel con-
ducting internal corporate investigations ensure that they can pro-
tect the results of their efforts, for any factual admissions made to an
adversary-even if accepted with an express no-waiver understand-
ing-may trigger a Martin Marietta-type waiver.
Equally astonishing, courts also seem willing to find implied
waivers in the context of the routine annual disclosure letter from
outside counsel to a corporation's accountants. 193 If the attorney-
client relationship is to have any meaningful protection at all, it
seems axiomatic that required public disclosures cannot be deemed
to waive privileges and protections attaching to information in the
lawyer's file.
The government is appearing more frequently in this arena, not
only as an interested third-party observer but also as an aggressor.
The government probably will claim upon the slightest pretext a
waiver of the protection of underlying information in internal cor-
porate investigations, and it is certain that the government now has
little incentive to receive proffered information on any basis that al-
193. See supra notes 130-155 and accompanying text.
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lows undisclosed underlying material to remain privileged or pro-
tected. Moreover, a sudden interest in the identity of lawyers' cash-
paying clients and the stark possibility of restrained or forfeited' 94
legal fees have caused the defense bar to view the Department of
Justice even more skeptically. Although client identity and fee infor-
mation traditionally has not been viewed as privileged, the govern-
ment's interest in such information is only very recent.' 95
The rules that historically have governed the trial lawyer have
changed dramatically, although perhaps not as much as Martin Mar-
ietta claimed in its petition for rehearing: that no meaningful settle-
ment discussions in any civil or criminal case can occur without loss
of work-product protection, and that routine civil discovery has
been expanded to include counsel's notes and memoranda of inter-
views. 196 Nevertheless, at a minimum, the trial lawyer's choices are
more uncertain. In the course of litigation, lawyers customarily en-
gage in settlement discussions or plea negotiations, which the law
encourages. 197 Do disclosures of privileged information in such ne-
gotiations result in the loss of attorney-client privilege or work-
product protection for undisclosed underlying information or docu-
ments? If there is such a risk, should counsel conducting internal
corporate investigations do things differently: make written memo-
randa as cryptic as possible, or not identify the witness by name, or
not reduce witness interviews to writing at all?
Perhaps this erosion of the protections covering a lawyer's liti-
gation file will precipitate a return to the days before electronic
copiers or even typewriters, when lawyers did their business orally
and kept their files in their heads. After all, these new rules of dis-
covery cover only documents and tangible items, and constitute an
obvious reason to forgo documentation and the recording of discus-
sions with clients. Ironically, concern for precisely this result was
among the reasons the Supreme Court reaffirmed the work-product
privilege in Hickman v. Taylor :198 "much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten.""' We have not yet reached the
point where lawyers can be compelled to disclose their unrecorded
194. See supra note 170.
195. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
196. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc at 3, In re Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-3648), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1655
(1989).
197. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408, 410.
198. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
199. Id. at 511.
1990] 945
946 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 49:917
thoughts and information, and we likely never will, but there ap-
pears to be little left of the traditional sanctity of the litigation file.
